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A recent article on the London mayoral election suggested that the way the public voted
showed that a majority of people did not understand the voting system used. Patrick
Dunleavy explains why this criticism of the voting system is quite unfounded.
Looking back at the mayoral election in London, James Ball writ ing in the Guardian
Comment section outlines some problems as he sees it with the Supplementary Vote
system used to elect London’s powerf ul mayor.  He writes:
The vast majority of voters decided to use their second preference vote: 1.76 million second
preferences were cast, around 80% of the electorate. But only around one in 10 of these
were actually counted towards the total. Of the 346,000 or so people who voted for one of the
minority candidates, only 185,000 actually cast their vote in such a way as to influence the
result.
More than 1.1 million people cast their second preference for a candidate with no chance of
being in the run-off for the final two. There are two ways to interpret the figures: a large
portion of Londoners don’t fully understand the voting system, or they are using it in a
remarkably sophisticated way to send subtle signals to minority candidates.
If  this was the case, there does seem to be a problem. Af ter all, only 2.2 million people voted in total in
this election (a 38 per cent turnout), and if  half  of  them supported second pref erence candidates who
were already f oreseeably going to be knocked out of  the f inal count, then is Ball not right to conclude
that this could not be a conscious choice on the part of  so many voters, but instead must show ‘that
they do not understand the system?’
My table below shows that only just over 346,000 voters supported candidates ranked third or lower on
the f irst pref erence round. At most then, only three out of  ten of  the 1.1 million second pref erence votes
f or candidates knocked out on round 2 could mathematically have come f rom people who voted twice f or
eliminated candidates. But in f act, more than half  of  these voters not choosing Boris or Ken on the f irst
round (i.e. 185,000 people) then opted to support one of  the two in their second pref erence vote, so
voting to decide the outcome.
That leaves 989,000 Londoners who cast second pref erences votes f or candidates who had no chance
of  being in the f inal two. Where did they come f rom? Again, the Table below shows that all these people
had already voted f or Ken or Boris on their f irst pref erence vote, but were now choosing a second
pref erence – e.g. someone who backed Ken voting Green on second pref erence, or a Boris supporter
voting UKIP.
So the majority of  these voters cast their pref erence f or one of  the top two people in the election, and
contributed to one of  them winning. Then they used their second pref erence vote to signal support f or
one of  the remaining candidates f rom a smaller party. What on earth is the reason f or supposing that
these voters did not know what they were doing? They cast an ef f ective f irst vote, and used their
second vote to signal a second pref erence.
In f act the vast mass of  Londoners voted completely ef f ectively in this election, as in the past. The
number of  people who choose to support two eliminated candidates across the election as a whole –
and whose votes were not theref ore ‘eligible’ in the second round of  the election – was just over
161,000, or 7 per cent of  the init ial f irst pref erence votes.
All we know about these people (who cast two votes inef f ectively) is that they decided f or their own
reasons to vote f or candidates who could not win rather than support Boris or Ken, who could. Yet I can
easily see a voter wanting to support both the Greens and the Lib Dems, or both UKIP and the BNP, and
believing that this was more important f or them than inf luencing the Boris/Ken outcome. There is no
basis at f or interpreting this to means that such voters didn’t understand the system. We cannot in any
way devalue or demean their choices.
Ball does have some potentially usef ul comments later on about the weakness of  the London Assembly
in terms of  constraining the Mayor. But again he misleads on voting systems, by crit iquing the f act that
the Conservatives won 9 seats on the Assembly (38 per cent) f rom a 32 per cent vote share – and thus
have a ‘veto-block’ on Assembly decisions. A key issue here is that the Assembly has only 25 members in
it, so even if  it  used the most hyper-proportional voting system in the world it could only be an accurate
ref lection of  vote shares within a range of  plus or minus 4 per cent – because each time a seats
changes hands (potentially carried by a single vote) it shif ts by 4 per cent who gets what in the Assembly.
A second reason why the Conservatives are over-represented is because there is a 5 per cent votes
threshold f or winning any Assembly seats at all – a measure that is designed to stop small parties like
the BNP winning seats without gaining signif icant support. So the Conservatives (together with Labour
and other parties who did win seats) benef it f rom getting part of  the smallish seats share that would
otherwise go to the ‘below threshold’ parties. Yet the threshold is a saf eguard that most people will f eel
def ends democracy against extremist parties, rather than diminishing it.
Summing up, the Supplementary Vote electoral system again worked very well in London in 2012. It
produced a clear winner, accepted by all the participants and all London’s voters, f or the f ourth t ime in a
row. And it allowed London’s sophisticated and intelligent voters to send strong signals about their
multiple pref erences, while yet deciding the race between the top two candidates. Similarly the Additional
Member System used f or the Assembly worked very well, producing a diversity of  parties and ref lecting
accurately how people voted.
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